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Small-scale fisheries are subject to various governing institutions operating at different levels with 29 
different objectives. At the same time, small-scale fisheries increasingly form part of domestic and 30 
international market chains, with consequent effects for marine environments and livelihoods of the 31 
fishery-dependent. Yet there remains a need to better understand how small-scale fisheries market 32 
chains interact with the range of governance institutions that influence them. In this paper, we 33 
examine how multiple governance systems function along market chains, in order to identify 34 
opportunities for improved multi-scale governance. We use three small-scale fisheries with varying 35 
local to global market chains operating in the Asia-Pacific region to develop a framework for analysis. 36 
Drawing from Interactive Governance theory we identify governing systems that have come to 37 
operate at particular sections in each market chain. We recognize four institutions that shape the 38 
governance over the length of the chain; namely those centred on (i) government, (ii) private sector 39 
and pricing, (iii) decentralized multi-stakeholder management, and (iv) culture and social relations. 40 
The framework shows how diverse arrangements of these governing institutions emerge and take 41 
effect along market chains. In doing so, we seek to move away from prescribed ‘ideals’ of universal 42 
governing arrangements for fisheries and their market chains, and instead illuminate how governing 43 
systems function interactively across multiple scales.  44 
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1 INTRODUCTION 68 
 69 
Globally small-scale fisheries (SSF) form an important source of livelihood for the majority of 70 
households in rural coastal communities, particularly those in the Asia-Pacific region (R. S. Pomeroy 71 
& Andrew, 2011; R. S. Pomeroy et al., 2007). At the same time, today’s global multi-billion dollar 72 
seafood trade has doubled in value between 2010 and 2015 (Rabobank, 2015). SSF are responsible 73 
for a significant proportion of the seafood trade (Chuenpagdee, 2011). The dramatic growth in trade 74 
means small-scale fishers are also rapidly increasing their connection to traders, distributors and 75 
consumers through domestic and international market networks and draws SSF more tightly into 76 
global systems (Dicken, 2011). This growth also means increases to the number of actors involved, 77 
the diversity of their interactions, and the complexity of market chains or networks (Crona, Van Holt, 78 
Petersson, Daw, & Buchary, 2015). Whilst expansion of the seafood trade offers much promise for 79 
net economic growth, there is parallel concern for pressure on fisheries resources and the equitable 80 
economic distribution of benefits for the men and women most in need (Béné, Hersoug, & Allison, 81 
2010; Berkes et al., 2006; Pauly, Watson, & Alder, 2005). 82 
 83 
Recent debates have illuminated the dual concerns of sustainability and equity, but in doing so have 84 
tended to position markets as either an economic opportunity or a threat to environmental 85 
sustainability and equity objectives. The penetration of markets into SSF is regarded as a driver of 86 
resource exploitation—manifesting in boom-and-bust cycles and/or serial depletions—, an unruly 87 
risk to sustainable resource management, and a counter force to food sovereignty and food security 88 
for those with few nutritionally equivalent alternatives (Cinner, Graham, Huchery, & Macneil, 2013; 89 
Pauly et al., 2005). On the other hand, many development strategies suggest markets can provide 90 
opportunities for people to increase income and create pathways out of chronic poverty (Béné et al., 91 
2015; Ponte, Kelling, Jespersen, & Kruijssen, 2014; Stevens, Irwin, Kramer, & Urquhart, 2014). 92 
Although useful for distilling narratives about the role and character of markets, siding with either 93 
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polar perspective on the ‘threat-to-opportunity’ spectrum offers little meaningful guidance on how 94 
to best govern SSF and their markets for any particular set of environmental or development 95 
objectives.  96 
 97 
In this paper, we build on the growing understanding that SSF governance should move beyond the 98 
capture and production element of fisheries to encompass trade interactions across the market 99 
chain (e.g. Bailey, Bush, Miller, & Kochen, 2016; Crona et al., 2015). Rather than treating markets as 100 
a distinct external factor that fisheries management regimes and associated institutions need to 101 
‘deal with’, we position them as an integral part of SSF. This in turn has implications for how we 102 
approach fisheries governance and what can be done to enhance governability. We argue that in 103 
paying greater attention to the interactions that market chains develop with the expanding array of 104 
institutions involved in SSF, governance holds the key to understanding, and ultimately promoting, 105 
the productive functions of markets that can be used to benefit small-scale fishing communities 106 
equitably and maintain or improve health of ecosystems.  107 
 108 
Market chains span politically distinct scales, borders and institutions across local-level production 109 
and national, regional or even global level trade and distribution nodes (Bush, Oosterveer, Bailey, & 110 
Mol, 2014; Song, Scholtens, Stephen, Bavinck, & Chuenpagdee, 2017). Demand-driven consumer 111 
markets in China have, for instance, intensified the exploitation of resources across large parts of the 112 
tropics (Eriksson et al., 2015). Such drivers affect decision-making by small-scale fishers to target 113 
particular species (e.g. groupers, sea cucumbers) or deliver products in particular forms (e.g. live, 114 
smoked). Additionally, the commodity type, specific consumer demands and the distance between 115 
supply source and consumer base all determine a market chain’s functioning and structure (Crona et 116 
al., 2016). Pelagic and coral finfish fisheries that target mobile fish stocks, for example, may demand 117 
higher capital investment, risk and operational costs for fishers than those involved in gleaning 118 
fisheries targeting stationary species like sea cucumber, shellfish and molluscs. Similarly, processing 119 
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and transportation costs differ significantly in transferring live fish to international consumers in 120 
comparison to dead fish or dried products (ADM Capital Foundation, 2016), or in trading products 121 
from wild caught fisheries versus aquaculture.  122 
 123 
Much of the existing literature focuses on documenting market chains, understanding the flow of 124 
resources and/or noting the impacts of trade mechanisms (e.g. Cinner et al., 2013; Gephart & Pace, 125 
2015). A more nuanced understanding is needed of the various contexts in which governance actors 126 
(e.g. fishing communities and government agencies) function in relation to different sections of 127 
market systems, and the multiple objectives these actors are pursuing (Béné et al., 2016; Kittinger et 128 
al., 2015; Wamukota, Brewer, & Crona, 2014). Recent literature has analysed fisheries governance as 129 
the outcome of complex interactions along market chains. One group of scholars have looked at the 130 
dynamic, complex, diverse and multi-scaled nature of SSF market interactions (Crona et al., 2016; 131 
Crona et al., 2015), resulting in a necessary disaggregation of a fisheries governance system into 132 
multiple, albeit sometimes hybridized, entities that comprise private sector, formal legislative 133 
bureaucracy and civil society-led arrangements. However, our approach involves examining market 134 
chains not only as interactive pathways for trade and resource flows, but also as multi-level channels 135 
within which different governance actors exert influence on a system, with different mandates and 136 
for different objectives. Political economy research on environmental governance along whole 137 
market chains, reveals the inadequacy of approaches that either idealise prospects for 138 
environmental leadership by powerful firms, or blame fisheries managers for weak governance 139 
(Havice & Campling, 2017). While that work focusses on industrial-scale fisheries and inter-firm 140 
relations, we encompass multiple actors and institutions playing important governance roles in SSF 141 
systems. Our paper joins these in addressing a significant and persistent research gap in the study of 142 




To advance this aim, we draw from interactive governance theory (Thorpe, Johnson, & Bavinck, 146 
2005) and develop an analytical framework that helps qualitatively assess the governance influences 147 
along market chains. We first introduce the analytical framework and provide the rationale of each 148 
of its components (Section 2). We provide a brief description of the methods (Section 3) and the 149 
three case examples from the Asia-Pacific region—Timor-Leste, Solomon Islands and the 150 
Philippines—and present an analysis of governance interactions (Section 4). We discuss the utility of 151 
the framework for identifying opportunities for interventions that may make market chains more 152 
governable (Section 5). 153 
 154 
2. ANALYTICAL FRAMEWORK 155 
 156 
We developed the analytical framework by drawing on the concept of governability as applied in 157 
interactive governance theory. Governability is a measure of the ability to actively and intentionally 158 
rebalance the ever-present interaction between societal needs on the one hand and governing 159 
capacities on the other (Kooiman, 1993; Song, Johnsen, & Morrison, 2018). The concept analytically 160 
organizes SSF systems into three main governance components (Jentoft & Chuenpagdee, 2015). 161 
First, the ‘system to be governed’ (SG) involves the natural and societal systems associated with 162 
fisheries that are subject to control, management and regulation. Second, the ‘governing system’ 163 
(GS) involves the various institutions, their day-to-day operations and the organizational values, 164 
which together exert influence over the system to be governed (Chuenpagdee & Song, 2012). Lastly, 165 
‘governance interactions’ (GI) involves the interplay, relationships and mechanisms that allow for 166 
exchange between these systems (see Figure 1). Jentoft and Chuenpagdee (2015: 21) argue that any 167 
assessment of a fishery’s governability depends not only on the capacity of the governing systems, 168 
but also on the fishery itself (i.e. the SG) and the interactions between these. To further enable 169 
governability as a heuristic tool, here we develop approaches that represent the degree and quality 170 
of exchange between a GS (e.g. institutions and resources at disposal) and a SG (e.g. livelihood needs 171 
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and market dynamics) (Jentoft & Chuenpagdee, 2015; Kooiman, Bavinck, Chuenpagdee, Mahon, & 172 
Pullin, 2008). The analytical framework we propose interrogates in more detail the capacity and 173 
characteristics of these components and their interactions. 174 
 175 
INSERT FIGURE 1 HERE 176 
 177 
2.1 The system to be governed 178 
 179 
Because of the highly connected nature of market chains, we regard the SG as the whole of a market 180 
chain comprised of market chain ‘sections’, as opposed to typical depiction in the literature as 181 
commodity flows occurring between specific trade-points or ‘nodes’. A market chain section may 182 
therefore encompass several nodes. We distinguish four market chain sections, wherein fish 183 
products are subject to particular kinds of processing and/or exchange depending on the level of 184 
social organization and trade motivations, which we label: ‘Supply’, ‘Domestic trade and 185 
consumption’, ‘International trade and consumption’, and ‘(International) End-consumer market.’ 186 
This categorisation of market chain sections—instead of nodes—works to capture the plurality of 187 
governance arrangements across varying scales and contexts; acknowledging a degree of ‘messiness’ 188 
in how commodities flow through networks. It is broadly consistent with the existing literature on 189 
fish chains (Khan & Chuenpagdee, 2014; Thorpe et al., 2005) and global value chains (Gereffi, 190 
Humphrey, & Sturgeon, 2005; Gereffi & Lee, 2012; Grunert et al., 2005; Humphrey & Schmitz, 2001) 191 
that also analyse commodity flows across fish capture, post-harvest distribution and consumption, 192 
including dynamics of global trade (i.e. beyond points of export and realms of national sovereign 193 
government rule). Yet, what we propose is more suited for emphasising context and the ‘horizontal’ 194 
relations that are also central to understand seafood-related transactions and governance along the 195 
chain (Bolwig, Ponte, Du Toit, Riisgaard, & Halberg, 2010). The points of division between the four 196 
sections are in practice often blurred by the frequent functioning of actors across scales and through 197 
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overlapping jurisdictional boundaries. Importantly, as analytical divisions they allow us to identify 198 
sufficiently distinct patterns through which trade-related governance arrangements emerge. 199 
 200 
We define the ‘supply’ section as the capture fishery, i.e. activities running up to the point fish are 201 
landed but before they are traded. This section of the chain therefore encompasses governance of 202 
capture fisheries, the social organization around them and stock management. Governance action 203 
here therefore focuses on controlling practices ‘out on the water’, with rules, norms, and conditions 204 
moderating fishing behaviour. These may include clear and apparent regulations on allowed catch 205 
volumes, fisher registration, property rights, or restrictive measures on gear, capacity, space and 206 
time, but also more subtle (at least to outsiders), informal (culturally-defined) rules around access. 207 
The jurisdictional frame of formal governance applied depends on the location of fishing, catch 208 
landing sites and/or the origin of fishers. 209 
 210 
The ‘domestic trade and consumption’ section involves the economic transactions taking place from 211 
the point of first trade between fishers and traders to the point of final domestic consumption 212 
(either within local or national boundaries) or, in the case of export chains, to the point that the 213 
commodity leaves the country. This section is subject to national law and legislation of the country 214 
where the SSF commodity is sourced. Depending on the type of resource and/or market chain, 215 
activities in this section may either be highly informal (e.g. fisheries marketed locally to meet 216 
demand for protein), or highly organised and trackable (e.g. fisheries feeding into products requiring 217 
technical processing stages). Measures for control may, for example, centre on market actors (e.g. 218 
licensing domestic traders or established exclusionary trade arrangements), commodities at local 219 
markets (e.g. monitoring traded goods or cultural taboos on certain resources), food safety and 220 
security (e.g. laws or cultural rules on consumption of fish), or species or area protection (e.g. 221 




The ‘international trade and consumption’ section involves economic transactions across 225 
(sometimes multiple) international borders as part of transit import/export trade, which may also 226 
service (marginal) consumer markets along the trade path. Given that resources are in international 227 
transit, transactions may form through application and evasion of international law, and through 228 
opportunity provided by (in)coherence of rules across different jurisdictions and porous borders that 229 
offer alternative, less resistant trade routes. Governance focus therefore centres around trans-230 
border commodity flow, including border control, international trade sanctions, and/or multilateral 231 
conventions such as CITES.  232 
 233 
The section of ‘international end-consumer market’ involves transactions taking place from the point 234 
of import, involving distribution through wholesalers into the final main consumption market of 235 
retail and/or restaurant sectors. Governance influences converge here mainly on promoting and/or 236 
restricting consumers and consumption patterns. Measures may then involve campaigns by lobby 237 
groups to raise awareness and curb the consumption of particular commodities, certification efforts 238 
to assure consumer products meet ethical requirements, sustainability or food safety standards, 239 
authenticity product branding and marketing to appeal to consumers (e.g. wild caught Atlantic 240 
salmon versus farmed salmon), or traceability initiatives to make product sourcing transparent. 241 
However, consumption requires supply, so actors in this section may similarly invest significantly in 242 
ensuring supply matches market preferences, whether that be for specialised luxury commodities 243 
like live reef fish or more widely consumed commodities like dried sea cucumber. In such cases cross 244 
scale connections with international transit hubs or even supply sections require fostering, and 245 
would warrant investment from trade actors at the consumer end. 246 
 247 
2.2 The governing system 248 
 249 
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Governance is typically seen to be delivered in some form through three broad, functionally distinct 250 
sectors: the state as the hand of ‘reason’, market as hand of ‘interest’, and civil society as hand of 251 
‘passion’ (Meuleman, 2008; Offe, 2000). Where there is general consensus in the literature on what 252 
constitutes the state and the market, civil society has been subject to more debate (Arato & Cohen, 253 
1988; Jensen, 2006). In capturing a broad socially driven interpretation of civil society, Dabhi (2005: 254 
39) suggests it entails everything that is not state or market, referring to it as ‘that section of society 255 
which is distinct from the state machinery and market and does not represent their interests’. Many 256 
pragmatic definitions, however, refer to civil society simply as the role of non-government 257 
organizations (NGO), while others include social institutions that make up the fabric of society as an 258 
equally important dimension (Viterna, Clough, & Clarke, 2015). In the context of good governance of 259 
SSF, both culturally-embedded institutions and platforms delivered by NGOs have proven to be 260 
imperative (Jentoft, 2000). We therefore further elaborated the conventional three-way sectoral 261 
conception for governance to explicitly involve a dual distinction within the civil society sector: firstly 262 
the influential role of co-management platforms as typically driven by NGOs and secondly, the social 263 
relations and cultural institutions that are inherent to fishing, trading and consuming seafood. 264 
 265 
To represent different configurations of a GS, we focus on four institutions, namely (i) government 266 
(e.g. the state), (ii) private sector and pricing (e.g. the market), (iii) multi-stakeholder management 267 
(e.g. co-management platforms involving NGOs), and (iv) culture and social relations (e.g. an often 268 
non-codified customary system) (Figure 1). Without implying that these institutions are mutually 269 
exclusive of one another, we propose that these distinctions enable an understanding of how 270 
different institutions function relative to one another and exert influence on the various sections of 271 
the market chain. It is worth mentioning that although governance institutions presiding over the 272 
international trade and consumption section of market chains may not hold the sustainability 273 
objectives as a primary rationale for governing a fishery (but likely focusing on enhancing trade 274 
efficiency and fairness, food safety, quality and profitability), their activities can still strongly 275 
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enhance or compromise the function of a fishery; even the actions taking place at the supply end. 276 
Hence, they are included in the discussions pertaining to fishery sustainability and equity. 277 
 278 
The ‘government-centred’ institution involves actions and influence of a formal government, with its 279 
legislative and administrative frameworks, and form the primary means of regulating resources 280 
within the jurisdictional boundaries of a country (i.e. the exclusive economic zone). Enforcement of a 281 
government’s laws on fishing rights, techniques, import tariffs and seafood processing standards, for 282 
example, provide parameters within which various public and private actors should function. Factors 283 
affecting governments’ ability to control a fishery, may include the extent of accessibility to a fishery 284 
(i.e. physical remoteness or elusiveness of a SSF due to illegality), how strong a government’s rule of 285 
law and perceived legitimacy is, political stability, sophistication of legislation, human and financial 286 
resources of government agencies, and the presence or not of trade agreements.  287 
 288 
The ‘private sector and pricing’ institutions involve actors that trade fishery commodities, affect 289 
commodity price, to whom they are sold and in what form. Pricing affects the incentives for 290 
involvement and likelihood of change in fishing behaviour, since it determines whether or not 291 
markets exist, and how lucrative they are. Peaks and slumps in local and/or global commodity prices 292 
influence fishing effort through commercial linkages between private sector actors. The interplay of 293 
various private actors also creates political environments that affect the distribution of fishing 294 
capacity and exclusivity of the market. Commercial enterprises influencing how resources are used 295 
locally and channelled across systems or scales for example, provide services, technical support, and 296 
infrastructure (e.g. ice, training in fishing and postharvest handling, and infrastructure) that 297 
otherwise are not available. This determines to varying extents how SSF are managed. Private actors 298 
are increasingly viewed as crucial players in efforts to improve fisheries management through 299 
market-based measure such as certification schemes (Ponte, 2012). 300 
 301 
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The ‘multi-stakeholder management’ institution refers to structures, organizations and actors that 302 
exert influence on principles of broad (democratic) inclusion. Co-management regimes, typically 303 
understood to involve collaborations between resource user groups and technocratic government or 304 
non-government agencies, are commonly applied to SSF; particularly in developing country contexts 305 
(Cohen & Steenbergen, 2015; Evans, Cherrett, & Pemsl, 2011). Where singular management regimes 306 
fail to adequately address disparate objectives, multi-stakeholder collaborative institutions seek to 307 
negotiate multiple objectives across interest groups to achieve broad support (Johnson, 2006; 308 
Jupiter, Cohen, Weeks, Tawake, & Govan, 2014). Here, local and external governance capacities are 309 
harnessed in various combinations. Consequently, local fishing practices subject to such multi-310 
stakeholder engagement are often bound by a suite of measures geared towards sustainable 311 
management that reflect broader paradigms like conservation and development (Cohen & Foale, 312 
2013; Cohen & Steenbergen, 2015).  313 
 314 
The ‘culture and social relations’ institution refers to people's affiliation to collective (cultural) norms 315 
and other forms of social relations that influence practice and decision making. The norms, values, 316 
individual agency, relationships and ‘rules of engagement’ by which people live significantly affect 317 
how fishers participate in a fishery (Brosius & Hitchner, 2010; Weeratunge et al., 2013). Cultural 318 
institutions and social practices that operate in wider contexts than the fishing sector are key to how 319 
people understand and use fishery resources. Customary systems of resource access and 320 
distribution, for example, are common across coastal communities in the region and often enacted 321 
through societal hierarchies (Alonso-Población, Rodrigues, Wilson, Pereira, & Lee, 2018; Cohen & 322 
Steenbergen, 2015). Fishing and trading behaviour in such cases may not only reflect economically 323 
rational decision-making, but also indicate strong underlying social rules, dependencies and 324 
accountabilities to which people are subject. These social relationships are also embedded in 325 
relations of power, for example, between men and women, or between different ethnic groups. 326 
 327 
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2.3 The governance interactions  328 
 329 
In applying the framework, we examine the relationships between the GS (focusing on governing 330 
institutions) and the SG (SSF market chains). We make a qualitative and gradated assessment of the 331 
relative influence of each type of institution within each section of the market chain by elucidating 332 
the particular characteristics and conditions associated with each set of interactions (see methods 333 
section for the assessment rubric). Examining then the situational fit between the governing and 334 
governed actors and structures can suggest how and under what conditions SSF and their associated 335 
market chains are more or less governable. 336 
 337 
It is important to consider in what ways governance interactions are highly variable according to the 338 
type of fishery resource, the scale of market, and other factors relating to socio-political and 339 
ecological contexts. The framework therefore does not intend to prescribe a single form of fit 340 
between governance arrangements and context as being superior or desirable. Instead, it explores 341 
interplays that determine how multiple governance arrangements along a market chain influence 342 
the sustainability objectives of SSF operations with different effects.  343 
 344 
3 METHODS 345 
 346 
In acknowledging that the systems we examined are complex, dynamic and changeable, and being 347 
driven by an interest to understand particular governance functions, we analysed market chains 348 
through a widely-applied qualitative case study methodology (Bennett & Elman, 2006; Bernard, 349 
2013; Flick, 2018). To illustrate different entry points for governance three SSF case studies are 350 
explored: local small-pelagic fish trade in Timor-Leste, national domestic reef fish trade in Solomon 351 
Islands and international live reef fish trade originating from the Philippines (see Figure 2). Cases 352 
were selected for geographic spread across the Asia Pacific region, to examine governance dynamics 353 
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of resource types, and to include market chains serving local (Timor-Leste), national (Solomon 354 
Islands) and international (Philippines) consumers. These case studies also exemplify settings where 355 
there is (governmental and non-governmental) impetus to improve economic development, 356 
ecological health and local food security outcomes. 357 
 358 
INSERT FIGURE 2 HERE 359 
 360 
An extensive desktop review of primary science literature, government and non-government 361 
reports, and publicly accessible statistical databases was conducted to understand SSF governance, 362 
markets and management. The review fed into the development of the different components of 363 
analysis in the framework. Specifically, this involved identifying key attributes of the SG (as 364 
presented in Table 1, and drawing from Agrawal, 2001; Armitage, Marschke, & Plummer, 2008; 365 
Baland & Platteau, 1999; Brewer & Moon, 2015; Carlsson & Berkes, 2005; Cinner, Wamukota, 366 
Randriamahazo, & Rabearisoa, 2009; Ostrom, 1990; R. S. Pomeroy & Andrew, 2011; R. S. Pomeroy, 367 
Katon, & Harkes, 2003; Wade, 1988), which subsequently framed our analysis of each case study. In 368 
addition authors drew in their research, published and unpublished (e.g. Barclay & Kinch, 2013; 369 
Cohen, Evans, & Mills, 2012; Fabinyi & Dalabajan, 2011; Fabinyi, Dressler, & Pido, 2017; Mills et al., 370 
2017). Case study assessments of governance constellations along the chains were made by each 371 
author, and were then subjected to critical review by other authors to ensure interpretation and 372 
application of the analytical frame was consistent. In line with the basic tenets of a qualitative 373 
research approach (Creswell, 1998), our collective appraisal of these case studies is not based on 374 
verified measurements of variables needed for generalizable comparison across cases. Instead, we 375 
present systematic observations that are illustrative of the various dimensions of complexity in SSF 376 
governance along market chains. 377 
 378 
INSERT TABLE 1 HERE 379 
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 380 
Our analysis examined the relative influence that governing institutions comprising the GS, had on 381 
governability of the SG at the various market sections. We developed a qualitative scale (ranging 382 
from ‘very strong influence’ to ‘no influence’) to indicate the extent of an institution’s governance 383 
influence (Table 2). To apply governance influence scores to institutions we followed a deductive 384 
process, involving reflectively comparing and adjusting scoring parameters to ensure levels of 385 
influence were ascertained consistently across the cases. Importantly, these assessments were 386 
accompanied by detailed case study descriptions that further contextualized how this result affected 387 
governability at that market section. 388 
 389 
INSERT TABLE 2 HERE 390 
 391 
4 CASE STUDIES 392 
 393 
Two of the three fisheries case studies present market chains serving domestic markets only (Timor-394 
Leste small-pelagic fishery serving a local district market and Solomon Islands mixed coastal seafood 395 
fishery serving a national inter-island market). These two case studies highlight complexities of 396 
governance associated to the first two sections of SSF market chains, namely the ‘supply’ and 397 
‘domestic trade and consumption’ sections. The Philippines live reef fish fishery is a market chain 398 
that extends into international market networks. We use this case study to highlight governance 399 
complexities in international trade processes, by focusing on the international ‘trade and 400 
consumption’ and ‘end-consumer market’ sections of the market chain (see Table 3).  401 
 402 
INSERT TABLE 3 HERE 403 
 404 
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4.1 The small-pelagic fishery from Timor-Leste 405 
 406 
The domestic small-pelagic fishery has been identified as an important contributor to address Timor-407 
Leste’s rural chronic food and nutrition insecurity (Alonso Población, Wilson, Rodrigues, Pereira, & 408 
Griffiths, 2012; AMSAT International, 2011a; Andersen, Pant, & Haraksingh Thilsted, 2013; 409 
Democratic Republic of Timor-Leste, 2017). The government’s state building development strategy 410 
(Democratic Republic of Timor-Leste, 2011; Palmer & Amaral de Carvalho, 2008) includes a focus on 411 
increasing investment in, and production from, coastal SSF, and simultaneously strengthening 412 
governance systems and developing markets. Achieving these development targets is not without 413 
challenges, including a low capacity centralised government, scarce fishery data, ill-defined marine 414 
tenure, poor infrastructure and highly informal trade arrangements (Andrew, Kam, & Philips, 2011).  415 
 416 
Within the supply GS local social networks in and among communities that form around kinship 417 
relations, central points of local authority (power) and/or historical social ties between individuals, 418 
strongly influence the distribution of fishing capacity (Alonso Población, 2013; Alonso Población, 419 
Rodrigues, & Lee, 2013). Often smaller social groups in coastal villages enjoy higher customary status 420 
through their roots in particular traditional kinship structures (Alonso-Población et al., 2018). Such 421 
power hierarchies often appear through contemporary forms of formal village leadership (i.e. where 422 
national government apparatus like village government administrations are absorbed into local 423 
social structure) and can facilitate advantaged access to resources from outside aid, leading to 424 
higher fish catch capacity. Investment in fisheries from the government includes fishing gear 425 
handouts that tend improve capacity of particular social groups over others at village levels. The 426 
differential fishing capacity as well as livelihood orientation of households in Timorese coastal 427 
communities (Mills et al., 2017), reflects in often uneven distribution of returns from fishing effort 428 
across households in coastal communities. 429 
 430 
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Given the challenges a post-conflict, developing government faces in effectively reaching coastal 431 
communities, much of the Timor-Leste government’s effort to manage capture fisheries at grass-432 
root levels is seconded to, or implemented in tandem with, NGO initiatives. These form multi-433 
stakeholder co-management platforms for broad engagement (Wever, 2008). These arrangements 434 
at local level are primarily to ensure sustainable use of resources, and are less effective in controlling 435 
trade transactions flowing from catch landings (despite attention for this in coastal rural develop 436 
programs (Lentisco, Rodrigues, Pereira, Needham, & Griffiths, 2013)).  437 
 438 
Primary trade transactions at catch landing sites typically occur between fishers and local 439 
middlemen and/or mobile traders (Alonso Población et al., 2012). Trade channels extend through 440 
district level traders and collectors to consumers at district markets. In some communities, fishers 441 
who are part of a kin group have been observed to organize themselves along such social ties or 442 
trade exclusively with a middleman from the same kin group (Alonso Población, 2013). Social 443 
relations are thus highly important in steering human behaviour and decision making in the 444 
domestic trade of fish. Similarly, trading paths out of coastal communities are largely determined by 445 
established trading collaborations between local and district level traders, developed from 446 
accumulated trust and dependability over time (Steenbergen, unpublished). Engagement of external 447 
market actors at the village level is therefore strongly guided by established links between particular 448 
middlemen and distributors at village level (see also Alonso Población et al., 2012). However, the 449 
direct, immediate and personal accountabilities characterising trading relationships between 450 
‘neighbours’ and within families at the supply end play out different further up the market chain, 451 
where connections between actors extend over more expansive scales. Private sector and pricing 452 
institutions are highly influential in shaping actor connections in these spaces where social relations 453 
are diluted by space and time. Powerful, well-connected middlemen form significant nodes of trade 454 
and distribution, and strongly influence where the fish is sourced, traded and ultimately consumed. 455 
Connections over distance are maintained through trust and proven dependability (i.e. long term 456 
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trading relationships building on strong social capital), kin (i.e. inter-village kinship networks), and 457 
loose patron-client dependencies (i.e. through loan provisions that oblige fishers to trade with 458 
them). Trade is not regulated by any formal administrative governing capacity but rather appears 459 
primarily subject to informal maintenance among private market actors themselves. There is little 460 
evidence of multi-stakeholder platforms, like the NGO projects in villages acting on fish capture 461 
systems, operating further down the market chain. Government institutions, although present 462 
through, for example, village administrative bodies appear similarly weak in influence, whereby lack 463 
of capacity to enforce relevant law and legislation means fish trade remains largely unregulated (see 464 
Figure 3 for a schematic overview of governance influence on this fishery market chain). 465 
 466 
4.2 The mixed seafood coastal fishery from Solomon Islands 467 
 468 
Domestic seafood markets in Honiara have over recent decades expanded with the continued 469 
growth of more extensive domestic seafood collection and trade networks (Lindley, 2007). Whereas 470 
earlier, domestic fisheries in the Solomon Islands involved households mainly supplying local 471 
consumers in villages, now market chains are feeding Honiara, including the Central Market, with 472 
specialist traders buying fish from around the country. Fish are brought to market via public inter-473 
provincial shipping transport routes to and from Honiara. Traders communicate by mobile phone or 474 
radio with provincial trade coordinators regarding catching and transport of the fish and payment to 475 
fishers. These coordinators subsequently organize supply for a shipment, arrange payment to the 476 
fishers and send the fish packed in ice back to Honiara for the vendor to collect (Krushelnytska, 477 
2015).  478 
 479 
Social institutions and influence from private sector actors are important in directing fishing activity 480 
in the Solomon Islands domestic seafood fishery, as part of the supply GS. Depending on the 481 
strength of customary institutions, fishers in coastal communities to varying degrees fish according 482 
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to customary rules associated with reef ownership and access. Peoples’ position in local social 483 
structures (e.g. kin or clan) often determine with whom, where and when they could fish (Foale, 484 
Cohen, Januchowski-Hartley, Wenger, & Macintyre, 2011). Attractive price offers for bulk orders 485 
stimulates increased fishing, while high prices in Honiara (plus a lack of alternative employment 486 
options) creates an incentive to find ways to bring fish from rural areas to town, spreading fishing 487 
pressure, in some cases unsustainably (Brewer, 2011; Brewer, Cinner, Fisher, Green, & Wilson, 2012; 488 
Hamilton et al., 2016). 489 
 490 
Government regulations have little effective reach into rural areas where much of the fishing takes 491 
place (Cohen, Evans, & Govan, 2015). Monitoring and enforcing regulations on gear restrictions, for 492 
example, is beyond the reach of national or provincial governments. Cultural practices (including 493 
customary tenure) that govern access and use are, arguably, less able to govern in the face of 494 
commodification of marine resources (Cohen & Foale, 2013). Community-based resource 495 
management (CBRM) is a nationally prioritised approach to manage coastal fisheries (e.g. a main 496 
strategy put forward in the Solomon Islands National Plan of Action for the Coral Triangle Initiative), 497 
and is supported by government and non-government organizations alike. Regulations employed 498 
under CBRM arrangements include periodically-harvested closures (modified forms of area taboos), 499 
bans on taking undersized fish, use of nets and targeting spawning aggregations and re-stating 500 
government regulations (Cohen, Cinner, & Foale, 2013; Schwarz et al., 2017). The degree to which 501 
CBRM rules are locally implemented and enforced is variable (Cohen & Steenbergen, 2015), and the 502 
outcomes rules have on resource status is poorly studied. 503 
 504 
Within the domestic trade and consumption section of the market chain, governance influence over 505 
trade appears highest from private sector and pricing institutions, followed by culture and social 506 
relations and government institutions, with multi-stakeholder engagement being of lowest 507 
influence. The prices of fish in Honiara markets drive regional fisheries supplying these markets. 508 
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Transport and availability of ice are key enabling factors for the trade – it is only possible to supply 509 
urban markets from rural areas where these are present (Barclay & Kinch, 2013; Gillett, 2010). There 510 
are a handful of ice centres across the country, all of which are government subsidized, as are the 511 
regular transport routes, which cover only a few locations in each province. As such, private sector 512 
traders using government-supported services determine where fishing is conducted (Lindley, 2007). 513 
The national Ministry of Fisheries and Marine Resources (MFMR) has been monitoring reef fisheries 514 
since 2012 through enumeration of market data via a project called Hapi Fis, whereby data on size, 515 
species and pricing at markets is collected. These data indicates that vendors have significant 516 
freedom to set prices, although prices are often fairly uniform across markets (R. Pomeroy & Yang, 517 
2014).  518 
 519 
Social relations and culture shape the market chains. For example, one study has found that 520 
suppliers often sell to trusted traders over traders offering higher prices if there is not a trust 521 
relationship (Brewer, 2011). A strong cultural influence on the Honiara market section of the chain is 522 
that traders in Honiara do not buy from all over the country, but draw mainly from kin networks to 523 
source from their home region (Brewer, 2011; Krushelnytska, 2015).  524 
 525 
Local government provides market facilities and there have been some grassroots and donor-526 
supported projects to improve conditions for market traders, such as Mere Markets (organised by 527 
Solomon Islands Women in Business) and the UN Women Markets for Change initiative. These, along 528 
with subsidies for ice and transport, constitute government and multi-stakeholder efforts to 529 
promote regional fisheries supplying urban markets. There has been no government or multi-530 
stakeholder engagement initiatives to improve fisheries sustainability around the domestic market 531 
section of the chain. Instead, sustainability initiatives have thus far focussed directly on fisheries 532 
management and resource use (see Figure 3 for a schematic overview of Governance influence on 533 
this fishery market chain). 534 
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 535 
4.3 The live reef fish for food fishery from the Philippines 536 
 537 
The live reef fish trade from the Philippines serves an international luxury food consumer market 538 
mainly in Hong Kong and mainland China. Since the grouper species targeted are relatively long-lived 539 
and slow-growing they are vulnerable to overfishing, which explains why the fishery is widely 540 
considered to be unsustainable and overfished (ADM Capital Foundation, 2016; Sadovy de 541 
Mitcheson et al., 2017). After capture, fish are typically sold either to local ‘middlemen’ or direct to 542 
traders located in municipal towns and provincial capitals, who in some cases operate as agents of 543 
exporting companies in Manila. The fish are flown by charter airplane to Manila, from where 544 
exporting companies utilise commercial flights to Hong Kong to export them. The commodity enters 545 
‘international trade’ in Hong Kong. Although a significant portion of live reef fish is consumed here, 546 
the majority—albeit unknown—amount of fish is re-exported to mainland China. The trade through 547 
Hong Kong is deliberate to avoid tariffs imposed by mainland China, a practice known as ‘grey 548 
trading’ that also affects other high-value fishery commodities such as shark fin and sea cucumbers, 549 
many of which are also re-exported through Vietnam (Eriksson & Clarke, 2015). In the final 550 
‘consumer market’ section, the fish are traded via wholesalers and distributed to consumers as 551 
luxury food in restaurants and at banquets.  552 
 553 
The institutional configuration within the supply GS and domestic trade and consumption GS reveal 554 
similar structural arrangements. Government and private sector and pricing institutions have higher 555 
influence than socio-cultural or multi-stakeholder engagement institutions. Coastal fisheries in the 556 
Philippines are mostly regulated by local governments at the municipal level, applying various 557 
national laws such as the Fisheries Code of 1998 (Republic Act (RA) 8550, subsequently amended 558 
with the RA 10654 in 2015) and the Local Government Code of 1991 (RA 7160). Specific provincial 559 
laws and institutions in Palawan province, which supplies about half of the total live reef fish exports 560 
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from the Philippines (Padilla et al., 2003), also have authority and responsibility to manage natural 561 
resources. There have been many attempts and initiatives to make the fishery more environmentally 562 
sustainable, including banning use of cyanide and grow-out cages, instituting regulatory measures 563 
(e.g. mandatory cyanide testing procedures, closure seasons, size limits and quotas), and 564 
establishing marine protected areas (MPAs). Trade of certain particularly vulnerable species such as 565 
the Napoleon wrasse (Cheilinus undulates, Labridae) and the Humpback grouper (Cromileptes 566 
altiveles, Serranidae) has been banned. However, while some measures have been successfully 567 
introduced, attempts by the government to regulate the trade have met with limited success and 568 
the fishery is still considered unsustainable (Fabinyi & Dalabajan, 2011). Local regulations that are 569 
successfully applied in one municipality mean that the fishery moves quickly to another area without 570 
such regulation in the manner of a ‘roving bandit’ (Scales, Balmford, Liu, Sadovy, & Manica, 2006). A 571 
lack of capacity, conflicts of interest and corruption among some government institutions hampers 572 
efforts to control the fishery. Many fishers in the fishery have few alternative livelihoods and a high 573 
financial dependence on the fishery, highlighting the role of the private sector and pricing in 574 
governing this fishery. Traders play powerful roles in the trade at local levels (Fabinyi & Dalabajan, 575 
2011), while fishers who are in financing arrangements with local traders get lower prices than 576 
independent fishers. Because such financing arrangements are highly personalised and strongly 577 
embedded within local socio-cultural norms, they are an example of how the ‘culture and social 578 
relations’ institution also has some influence at this scale.  579 
 580 
In the two international trade sections of the market chain, the ‘private sector and pricing’ and 581 
‘culture and social relations’ institutions claim dominant influence on governance, reserving a 582 
relatively limited role for government or multi-stakeholder institutions. Economic studies of the 583 
trade have concluded that most of the ‘value’ of the value chain is captured by Hong-Kong based 584 
actors (Cruz-Trinidad, Aliño, Geronimo, & Cabral, 2014), and successive studies have further 585 
identified Hong Kong based traders as particularly powerful actors (Fabinyi, 2015). They extend 586 
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finance through exporters across Southeast Asia, including the Philippines, and even further down to 587 
provincial level traders, making them dominant stakeholders along the supply chain. The established 588 
trading links between these key market actors makes access into the market difficult for new market 589 
actors. Entry into the market is protected on the basis that import-export transactions take place 590 
almost exclusively along highly trusted and long-term trading connections between actors in the 591 
Philippines, Hong Kong and mainland China. Social relations amongst market actors therefore 592 
appear highly influential on the functioning and governance of international live reef fish trade. 593 
Governance by governments in the international market has been hampered by the scale (beyond 594 
national jurisdiction) and complexity of the commodity flow. In the end-consumer section of the 595 
market chain, cultural norms such as ideas about the value of freshness and the institution of luxury 596 
seafood banquets in China drive the demand for live reef fish (or ideas about health in the case of 597 
sea cucumbers) (Fabinyi and Liu 2014) and hence play a significant role. Governments of consumer 598 
markets such as Hong Kong and mainland China have few interests in strong regulation of the 599 
fishery, but they still have influence particularly through an anti-corruption crackdown that has 600 
reduced the practice of banqueting and hence live reef fish consumption. Monitoring, traceability 601 
and transparent governance of the fishery by government agencies are hampered by the practices of 602 
‘grey trading’. Lastly, multi-stakeholder governance initiatives by international NGOs such as the 603 
World Wildlife Fund (WWF) work at building coalitions, including traders and government officials to 604 
collaboratively develop tools such as codes of conduct and certification. However most of these non-605 
government initiatives have had limited impact on supply and demand, arguably with the exception 606 
of the successful exploitation of CITES as a tool to limit trade in the endangered Napoleon wrasse 607 
(Sadovy de Mitcheson et al., 2017)(see Figure 3 for a schematic overview of governance influence on 608 
this fishery market chain). 609 
 610 
INSERT FIGURE 3 HERE 611 
 612 
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5 DISCUSSION 613 
 614 
A key utility of the framework introduced in this paper has been to identify the different roles of the 615 
four types of governing institutions, and to analyse their influences on the various sections of the 616 
market chain that render the fisheries trade system relatively more (or less) governable. We stress 617 
that the four types of institutions are only ideal types (hence overlap in practice), but they function 618 
here as a purposeful heuristic that allows us to uncover empirical trends among the case studies and 619 
across contexts. 620 
 621 
5.1 Illuminating relative influence of institutions along market chains 622 
 623 
The examination of the case studies through the framework reveals particular bottlenecks in market 624 
chains—also termed ‘pinch points’ (Humphrey, 2005)—where commodities and actors gravitate 625 
towards points of collection, transit and/or distribution, and form spaces of concentrated interaction 626 
in the commodity flow. Identifying these bottlenecks, and their governance conditions and contexts, 627 
reveals potential entry points where a new set of governance arrangements may offer an effective 628 
means to control, monitor, and/or regulate transactions. The connections between the more 629 
influential governing institutions that act at respective bottlenecks potentially provide further 630 
avenues for interactive governance between scales. 631 
 632 
The government-centred governing institution has shown limited influence in the supply section in 633 
all three cases. In developing country contexts, the capacity of central government to implement 634 
and enforce regulations over fisheries remains weak. There is little evidence of consistent 635 
monitoring and regulation of catch. Despite there being national fishery-related laws in place in all 636 
the case study countries, these are infrequently enforced at fishing levels. Even in the Philippines 637 
where government fisheries legislation has been lauded globally for its innovation (e.g. Alcala & 638 
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Russ, 2006), the government influence over the live reef fish fishery seems low. At points of 639 
import/export, however, government appears to have higher influence. Regulation of the export ban 640 
on Napoleon wrasse, for example, functions well at the primary export point in Manila (albeit less so 641 
at the export ‘backdoors’ in remote areas of southern Palawan and southwestern Mindanao). 642 
Moreover, in China and Hong Kong—the consumer countries for the live reef fish trade case study—643 
government interventions in import and export transactions proved most accurate and effective in 644 
estimating volume and species traded. This suggests then that although both Chinese and Hong 645 
Kong governments currently have a limited influence over tightly regulating consumption patterns 646 
and decisions, there is considerable scope for them to act on reducing the incidence of grey trading, 647 
as recent reports have also emphasised (e.g. ADM Capital Foundation, 2016; Wu & Sadovy De 648 
Mitcheson, 2016). 649 
 650 
The private sector and pricing governing institution appears highly influential in contexts where 651 
formal governing agents (e.g. governments or other agencies endowed with some form of mandated 652 
authority) are absent or have limited control. In all the case studies, commodities enter the market 653 
chain across dispersive supply networks rather than a singular physical node, since catch landing 654 
sites are often remote and located relatively close to fishing sites. Across all the case studies 655 
fisheries involved swift transport of the commodity towards market agents; either because fishers’ 656 
capacity (mobility and cold storage assets) is limited (e.g. Solomon Islands and Timor-Leste), or 657 
because particular product market demands requires technical input for the commodity to be 658 
tradable (the Philippines’ live reef fish trade where fish must be kept alive until consumption). In 659 
Timor-Leste and Solomon Islands major urban and district markets draw in end-consumers, implying 660 
that minimal further distribution occurs afterwards.  661 
 662 
Beyond domestic trading, the live reef fish international market chain case study shows how pivotal 663 
transit bottlenecks in international trading networks form in trading entrêpots like Hong Kong. Many 664 
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of the established networks of trade find their centre in Hong Kong, connecting source-country 665 
supply markets with international consumer markets. As such, pricing power is seen to centre 666 
around trade in Hong Kong. Prices for live reef fish in Philippines, for example, are reported to have 667 
been set in most cases according to what exporters are offered by their Hong Kong trading 668 
counterparts. Actors in these international trading hubs are highly knowledgeable of international 669 
market landscapes. They navigate legislative and fiscal barriers along extensive and well-developed 670 
regional networks to allow for minimal loss and efficient delivery of commodities to end-consumer 671 
markets. Diversion of trade through Vietnam to reach southern China, for example, indicates the 672 
scale these networks span. Furthermore, some collection and processing plants for live reef fish in 673 
the Philippines are part of international trading companies operating out of Hong Kong, as opposed 674 
to domestic export companies. In-country collection operations are thus highly influenced by market 675 
dynamics in the Hong Kong hub. 676 
 677 
The decentralized multi-stakeholder governing institution in the form of fisheries co-management 678 
regimes have varying influence. In the supply section, the case studies indicate a patchy influence 679 
dependent on the extent of supportive presence of NGOs. For example, in Timor-Leste, NGOs work 680 
to substitute the limited capacity of central government to contribute to the management of 681 
capture fisheries, indicating at least some influence of control over fishing by NGO-driven co-682 
management schemes. In our case studies multi-stakeholder coalitions to prevent overfishing have 683 
not thus far extended their activities into the domestic trade and consumption section of market 684 
chains. At an international level, however, multi-stakeholder coalitions are active on some trade 685 
issues through consumer behaviour campaigns on CITES and certification, yet these are very context 686 
dependent. The restaurant and luxury food industry in China, for example, forms an important 687 
governance bottleneck and a focus of many lobby initiatives against consumption of critically 688 
endangered and/or protected species, with arguably significant impact. 689 
 690 
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The cultural and social relations governing institution also has relatively high influence in particular 691 
contexts. At the supply level, this governing institution can be key in determining social authority 692 
over resources. For example, traditional authorities, rules and norms play significant roles 693 
determining access to reefs and fishing grounds in many countries of the Asia-Pacific. Fishers and 694 
local level market agents across all cases operate predominantly according to the social networks in 695 
and between fishing communities, as evident in the make-up of crews on fishing boats, associations 696 
between fishers and traders, and spread of catch capacity across a community’s fishing fleet. The 697 
distribution of the commodity from catch landing sites is often strongly determined by links that 698 
local fishers, or in-community traders, have with outside market agents. Predetermined trade paths 699 
from catch landing sites are common in two of the three market chains (Solomon Islands and 700 
Philippines), where demand drives fishing activity. Only in the Timor-Leste case is the extent of 701 
distribution variable depending on catch size, whereby high catches warrant farther distribution (i.e. 702 
Dili, where prices are better) while small or medium catches are traded to closer district markets. 703 
 704 
Even further along the market chain, many international trade channels are based on social 705 
networks, often heavily influenced by language and kinship. At the international consumer end in 706 
China, cultural and social institutions such as a belief in the importance of fresh fish that are kept 707 
alive until the last moment, the banquet culture, and the perceived health benefits of certain types 708 
of seafood are all key factors that underlie the strong demand for these products. Such strong 709 
demand has driven the establishment of market chains in new geographies. Organization around 710 
commodity collection and processing appears strongly embedded within social networks. This is 711 
evident in that even domestically owned export centres in the Philippines case operate along 712 
established trade links to foreign importers. Similar to relations between fishers and traders at catch 713 
landing sites, the trade connections between exporters and importers are often determined around 714 
demonstrated social capital, including trust, reliability, reputation and ethics (Fabinyi, 2015).  715 
 716 
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5.2 Applying the framework across multiple SSF market chain contexts 717 
 718 
To further reflect on the applicability of the framework, we draw here on other contexts of SSF 719 
markets chain from the literature, beyond the three cases presented above (e.g. both developed and 720 
developing country settings). In contexts where rule of law is weaker, and where corruption is 721 
present or suspected, government enforcement is likely ineffective. Such governance voids would 722 
allow other institutions to assume more influence, as we often see market mechanisms serving as a 723 
strong determinant of fishing patterns and exploitation rates around the world. This would suggest a 724 
stronger role expected of the private sector in harnessing its market power to push for sustainability 725 
measures, such as certification schemes in cases like the Philippine live reef fish SSF. However, in 726 
Australia, where rule of law is considered stronger (World Bank, 2016), the live grouper fishery has a 727 
different constellation of institutional influences at the supply section. More extensive government 728 
oversight has managed to stabilize fishing levels, despite continued high market prices (Frisch et al., 729 
2016; Leigh, Campbell, Lunow, & O’Neill, 2014). The framework can herewith be used to illuminate 730 
various possible arrangements towards governability of supply sections, despite different market 731 
chains sharing the same end-consumer market. 732 
 733 
Similarly, weaker government control over the supply section of the Timor-Leste and Solomon 734 
islands market chain cases has resulted in actors in the social relations and culture institution 735 
exerting relatively higher governance influence. Such outcomes are not only limited to the 736 
developing country context. Examples of temperate water SSF in the Global North also indicate 737 
importance of high social capital at supply ends of the market chain. Several North American SSF, for 738 
example, have proven to be highly socially embedded (Foley, Mather, & Neis, 2015; Pinkerton, 739 
1989), where co-operative management has been built on strong local social and cultural 740 
institutions. Furthermore, in the EU, bottom-up voluntary fishery management systems, like the 741 
‘inshore potting agreement’ (IPA) developed between fisher groups in Devon, England, show similar 742 
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grass-roots capacity in managing fisheries where regional, top-down EU policy could not closely 743 
intervene (Blyth, Kaiser, Edwards-Jones, & Hart, 2002). Stoll et al (2015) add to this by arguing that 744 
co-operative bodies forming from local social capital may, in the presence of a supportive 745 
government institution, develop into what they refer to as ‘institutional starters’; i.e. collective 746 
action groups sowing the seeds for co-governance arrangements that build on active civil society 747 
participation. With respect to these cases where existing social relations and cultural institutions 748 
operate alongside an active government institution, the current framework could be relied upon to 749 
help elucidate opportunities for shared governance roles. 750 
 751 
Finally, the ability of governance institutions to influence SSF market chains can also vary according 752 
to the commodity type. For example, multi-stakeholder coalitions, along with other factors, have 753 
contributed to reduced consumption of some luxury commodities; as shown in the live reef fish 754 
case. However, such coalitions have so far produced little influence over the consumption of other 755 
luxury species such as sea cucumbers (Purcell & Polidoro, 2014). This might be in part because live 756 
reef fish consumption, like shark fin, is mainly restricted to high-end restaurants and banquets. Its 757 
higher per kilogram market price owes to its (culturally-defined) perceived exclusivity and the 758 
technical transport measures required to keep the fish alive (Fabinyi & Liu, 2014). Sea cucumber, on 759 
the other hand, is far more extensively retailed, across both restaurants and households, as a dried 760 
product with a longer shelf life. Well-defined consumption points for live groupers (e.g. banquets) 761 
would likely offer a more accessible and actionable opportunity for direct intervention, as opposed 762 
to the extensively disbursed consumption patterns of sea cucumbers. Whereas the effectiveness of 763 
environmental campaigns against live reef fish or shark fin consumption is often associated with the 764 
higher charismatic value of these over sea cucumber (Eriksson & Clarke, 2015), differences in the 765 
market configurations can offer an additional explanation as to why environmental campaigns lead 766 
to varying levels of governance leverage. 767 
 768 
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6 CONCLUSION 769 
 770 
Notwithstanding their vital subsistence functions in many contexts, SSF globally are increasingly 771 
being driven towards commercialization. Market interactions, occurring at all scales, are a largely 772 
inevitable part of SSF functioning and fishers’ concerns (Béné, Steel, Luadia, & Gordon, 2009). SSF, 773 
on the whole, are intertwined with globalized seafood trade flows and a broadening of governance 774 
mechanisms (Campling & Havice, 2018). It is therefore increasingly important to treat them as a 775 
serious trade contributor and provide targeted research support. Given this outlook, our effort here 776 
bypasses the somewhat diametrically opposing understandings of market effects on SSF – i.e. either 777 
a cause of overfishing or an engine for development. Moreover, our position extends beyond the 778 
common-pool resource frame that regards markets as the external environment to SSF, by which 779 
their integration with markets then becomes a challenge to deal with ‘after the fact’ rather than an 780 
expected reality of any commercial endeavour (Agrawal, 2001).  781 
 782 
Here, we offer an analytical tool that can be used to proactively confront (and navigate) the socio-783 
ecological challenges that may arise from increasing market dependency and integration. In doing so 784 
we respond to calls for more integrated perspectives of SSF governance (Bush et al., 2014) and for 785 
broader principles of SSF governance to be applied to different extents and in different contexts 786 
(Jentoft & Chuenpagdee, 2015; Ratner & Allison, 2012). Additionally, while Berkes et al. (2006) 787 
advocate diverse, multilevel governance institutions, local to international, to cope with problems 788 
emerging from globalized trade and sequential exploitation, our framework furthers this task, by 789 
way of differentiating the multiple governing institutions and the market sections. Applying the 790 
current framework to analyse the market system associated with SSF will help elucidate what kind of 791 
governing institutions exert influence where along the market chains, and to what relative degree, 792 
to account for various sustainability and equity outcomes. This approach will help highlight 793 
opportunities for governing institutions to intervene and collaborate with others to achieve a 794 
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balanced and together more effective governance of market interactions. The current study has 795 
already identified potential for governments with limited capacity to focus on enforceable pinch-796 
points such as export-import sections and for multi-stakeholder coalitions to affect changes in the 797 
consumption patterns of international locations through lobbying initiatives. Also, recognizing social 798 
relations as a crucial determinant of trade connections between local fishers and traders as well as 799 
between exporters and importers opens up avenues for unique governance innovations. 800 
 801 
The current framework by no means excludes the application of existing models of fisheries 802 
governance; rather it highlights the need for application of context-driven governance tools that 803 
take into account interactivity across scales and diverse types of actors. This offers an alternative to 804 
blueprint frameworks that are either designed around, and/or driven by, a single governance 805 
institution (e.g. government) or focused on single nodes of a market chain (e.g. capture fisheries 806 
supply). Next to the recognized role for central governments, more prominent involvement of other 807 
governance institutions in the form of social and cultural institutions, private sector market 808 
institutions and decentralized multi-stakeholder institutions may offer a more transparent, 809 
accountable and effective way of conceptualizing and practising SSF governability. To ensure that 810 
the gains of market interactions are experienced more fairly and sustainably by those involved in the 811 
capture and trade of SSF products, a holistic and expanded governance lens such as this will serve as 812 
a critical asset. 813 
 814 
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Table 1 Collated guiding set of key ‘sustainability’ attributes of a System to be Governed as 1135 
extrapolated from literature (compiled from literature review, including Wade 1988, Ostrom 1990, 1136 
Baland and Platteau 1999, Agrawal 2001, Pomeroy et al. 2003, Carlsson and Berkes 2005, Armitage 1137 
et al. 2008, Cinner et al. 2009, Pomeroy and Andrew 2011, Brewer and Moon 2015). 1138 
1.0 Social 
1.1 Strength of social network: extent of social resilience, social group support, & sharing of risk/skills/knowledge 
1.2 Interdependent relationships (producers, traders, consumers): the extent of equitable (cultural & social) benefit distribution 
1.3 Cultural affiliation towards the resource The extent of cultural value & rules associated to resource use/trade/consumption 
2.0 Economic 
2.1 Dependence on resource: the extent of dependence on the resource (& trade) for livelihood & income 
2.2 Marketing system: the extent of openness or exclusiveness of a market. 
2.3 Equity of economic benefit distribution: the extent of equitable (monetary & material) benefit distribution 
2.4 Differential nature of product: the extent of distinct commodity value & symbolic value 
2.5 Export Markets: the extent of the commodity’s market chain length 
3.0 Political 
3.1 Leadership legitimacy: the extent of effective & legitimate leadership 
3.2 Equity of regulated access: the extent of equitable & regulated entry to the SSF/trade 
3.3 Just rule of law: the extent of legitimate control, management & regulation, & breadth of inclusion in decision making 
3.4 Tenure & property rights: the extent of recognised tenure & property rights 
4.0 Ecological 
4.1 Scale & definition: the extent of size & clarity of boundaries of the supply SSF 
4.2 Fishery supply characteristic: the extent of mobility of the resource, its seasonality, & requirement for processing 
4.3 Health status of the supply: the extent of depletion, rate of depletion & potential for recovery of a resource base 
5.0 Technological 
5.1 Consumer/Buyer choice: the extent of knowledge by consumers & retail buyers to make informed purchase 
5.2 Traceability: the extent of traceability of product source/trade/processing along market chains 
5.3 Fleet capacity in relation to resource: the extent of catching capacity (technology & investment) of a fleet/SFF 
5.4 Exclusion technology: the extent of processing activities, technology & distributive capacity enhancing exclusiveness 
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Table 2 Criteria guiding the qualitative scoring of the ‘extent of governance influence’ of a governing 1140 
institution within a section of a market chain. 1141 
Level of Influence Basis of measure 
‘Very strong 
influence’ 
- dominant (monopolising) control over market chain functionality by (formal or informal) 
rules & regulatory mechanisms 
- determinant enforcement/intervention with high compliance 
- evidence of exclusive transformative impact over market chain functionality 
‘Strong influence’ - (formal or informal) rules & regulatory mechanisms for control in place and active 
- effective enforcement/intervention with high compliance 
- evidence of transformative impact over market chain functionality alongside other 
influencing institutions 
‘Some influence’ - (formal or informal) rules & regulatory mechanisms for control in place but limited 
- limited enforcement/intervention 
- some evidence of impact over market chain functionality 
‘Little influence’ - minimal (formal or informal) rules & regulatory mechanisms for control in place 
- minimal enforcement/intervention 
- little evidence of impact over market chain functionality 
‘No influence’ - no (formal or informal) rules & regulatory mechanisms for control in place 
- no enforcement/intervention 
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Table 3 Overview of SSF case studies and their associated market chains 1143 




Timor-Leste small pelagics fishery 
Capture - including sardines (Herklotsichthys 
quadrimaculatus, Clupeidae), garfish 
(Hyporhamphus affinis, Hemirhampidae), 
flying fish (Cypslurus spp, Exocoetidae), 
long-tom (Tylosurus spp, Ablennes hians, 
Belonidae) and scads (Decapterus spp., 
Carangidae) 
- seasonal variability in fishing access and 
species target 
- low capacity fishery, est. 3000 registered 
vessels in Timor-Leste (Alonso Población et 
al., 2012), and 4-5000 fishers (Mills et al., 
2017) operating mainly from dugout canoes 
(with and without outboard motor), using 
nets and hand-line primarily within the 2 
nautical mile northern coastal zone and 
around fishing aggregation devices.  
- national fisheries catch estimated at 5-6000 
t (Barbosa & Booth, 2009). 
Subsistence consumption - portion of fish is 
consumed or gifted within villages before 
sales 
Retail - Infrastructural deficit means 
majority of catch is traded immediately and 
consumed within a short timeframe and in 
close proximity of catch landing sites 
(AMSAT International, 2011b; FAO, 2009). 
Marginal household processing of catch (i.e. 
salted or smoked) 
- majority trade through in-village and 
district level trade actors, through informal 
unregulated market networks 
- significant trade direct from 
fishers/traders to urban consumer through 
‘open access’ roadside sales 
Consumption – most frequent within 
district to rural and peri-urban consumers. 
Significant portion filters through to Dili 
urban markets, however is dependent on 
catch volume to justify effort (Alonso 
Población, 2013). 
Export - none 
N/A N/A 
Solomon Islands mixed domestic seafood coastal fishery 
Capture - extensive, multi-gear and multi-
species: 
- diverse finfish and invertebrates caught in 
lagoons, reefs and coastal pelagic areas 
from dugout canoes or dinghies with 
outboard motors, using lines, spears, nets 
and hand gathering. 
- boats and gear are owned by the fishers or 
family or community members. 
- pelagic fish caught by trolling or hand 
lining, including around fish aggregating 
devices (FAD).  
- gleaning in mangrove and reef areas for 
sales of crabs and shellfish. 
Subsistence consumption - portion of fish is 
consumed or gifted within villages before 
sales. 
Retail - direct sales to restaurants or 
catering companies. 
- fresh fish sold in villages or urban/peri-
urban markets. 
- cooked fish sold at markets (including 
unsold fresh fish cooked for sale the next 
day). 
- significant fish trade to Honiara Central 
market through specialist traders 
buying/collecting fish from fishers around 
the country. Fish transported by public 
inter-provincial transport routes to and 
from Honiara, using subsidized ice. 
Consumption – fish is the 3rd highest food 
expenditure for households after 
vegetables and bread and rice, at around 
17.8% (SINSO, 2015). 
- est. value and volume of commercial 
coastal fisheries for domestic consumption 
in 2014 was USD12.8 million, 6,468 tonnes 
(Gillett, 2016) 
Export - none 
N/A N/A 
Philippines live fish for food fishery 
Capture - targets groupers (Serranidae): 
leopard coral grouper (Plectropomus 
leopardus, Serranidae) and other species 
from the Plectropomus and Epinephelus 
genera 
- fishery considered overfished with a range 
of species listed as endangered or 
vulnerable on the IUCN Red List 
- fishing on shallow reefs with crewed boats 
using hook and line (and illegal destructive 
methods involving cyanide poisoning by 
divers using hookah gear). 
- fish stored alive during transit in aquaria on 
the boat (undersized catch - < 500gm - are 
grown out in cages (until 500gm-1kg)) 
Subsistence consumption - no subsistence 
consumption (besides opportunistic bycatch 
and fish that may die during transit) 
Retail - fish sold either to ‘middlemen’ or 
direct to traders in municipal towns and 
provincial capitals (‘local traders’, or 
‘exporters’ as agents of exporting 
companies in Manila).  
- patron-client relationships between some 
fishers and traders and/or exporters 
(financial support through provision of 
loans and gears to fishers)  
- trading hubs across the country, but 
approximately half of the national exports 
hail from Palawan province (Padilla et al., 
2003) 
Consumption – small amount in restaurants 
in Manila and other cities 
Export - fish are flown by charter airplane 
to Manila, where they are exported via 
commercial airplane to Hong Kong. 
Import & Export - 
‘grey trading’: a 
significant but 
unknown amount 
of fish are re-
exported from 
Hong Kong to 
mainland China. 
The Hong Kong 
diversion avoids 
trade tariffs.  
Import - via 
wholesalers to 
restaurants, where 
they are consumed in 
banquets 
Retail & Consumption 
- main end 
consumption for 
luxury food market in 
Hong Kong and China 




with value of total 
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FIGURE LEGENDS 1145 
 1146 
Figure 1 The analytical framework presented in terms of (i) the System to be Governed (SG), (ii) the 1147 
Governance Interactions, and (ii) the Governing Systems (GS) made up of their subsystem 1148 
arrangements at each market chain section.  1149 
 1150 
Figure 2 Three small-scale fisheries case studies from the Asia-Pacific. 1151 
 1152 
Figure 3 Institutional governance arrangements in three SSF market chains (local small pelagic 1153 
market chain in Timor-Leste, national mixed reef fish market chain in Solomon Islands, and 1154 
international luxury live fish for food market chain from The Philippines), indicating relative influence 1155 
of governing institutions, including (i) Government centred-, (ii) Private sector and pricing centred-, 1156 
(iii) Multi-stakeholder platform centred- and (iv) Culture and social relations centred institutions. 1157 
 1158 



